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Outline
• FAA NextGen Surveillance Mandate Challenges
• Air Traffic Use-Cases & Enterprise Blockchain
• Cryptographic Remedies







FAA Mandate: ADS-B by January 1, 2020
ADS-B (plaintext) Security Concerns
• Privacy: FAA redacted ~10%  Air Traffic from publication
• Military (~4.7 %)
• Corporate (~4.4.%)
• Authentication
• Signal Injection vulnerabilities (spoofing, denial-of-service)
Government Accounting Office Conclusions: 
• No approved solutions for ADS-B related risks
• DOD is not integrating NextGen requirements
• FAA will require ADS-B for Air Traffic Services
• Unresolved issues between DOD & DOT
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689478.pdf
• Private and Permissioned
• Enrollment (not “Proof of Work”)
• Membership Service Provider (MSP)
• Ledgers have two parts
• World State
• Transaction Log
• Chaincode (smart contracts)
• Peer Nodes
• Run chaincode 
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• Open-source enterprise-oriented blockchain platform 
(Hyperledger Fabric) may be leveraged as a practical 
cryptographic solution to provide security and privacy for ADS-B
• Demonstration Needed: ADS-B hardware running cryptographic 
codes without any additional expense or modification
• Research Issue: How will future Collision Avoidance technology 
work reliably with encrypted surveillance signals?
